SYMMETRY IN THE DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Abstract

This article examines the asymmetry between the quorum required for the approval of constitutional amendments and the quorum necessary for their declaration of unconstitutionality by the Supreme Federal Court (STF). It highlights that, while the constitutional legislative process requires a qualified majority of three-fifths in two rounds, the Court may invalidate such amendments by a simple majority of its members. The study argues that, based on the principles of constitutional symmetry and proportionality, this extraordinary judicial review should observe an equally qualified quorum. It also includes a brief jurisprudential analysis and proposes a normative solution, such as requiring three-fifths of the justices’ votes in actions challenging constitutional amendments. The article concludes that adopting a qualified quorum strengthens democratic legitimacy, limits judicial activism, and reinforces the coherence of constitutional rigidity.