PERPETRATION BY MEANS AND THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF JOHAN LIEBERT

A PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF EVIL IN MONSTER

Abstract

This article aims to examine the complex relationships between criminal law and the responsibility attributed to individuals who operate through psychological manipulations, using Johan Liebert, from the Japanese literary work Monster, as the object of study. The methodology adopted consists of an interdisciplinary bibliographic review, based on authors from the fields of philosophy, law, and sociology. Starting with the philosophical approach to evil and following with issues of moral and legal responsibility, the article seeks to investigate the limits of the current criminal justice system in addressing immediate crimes, highlighting the difficulties in proving authorship and causality in cases of indirect manipulation. Moreover, it discusses the unease between positive law and the ethical challenges posed by agents who transcend the role of material perpetrators, questioning the foundations of criminal attribution and justice. Through a reflection that encompasses contributions from theorists such as Hans Kelsen, Immanuel Kant, and Hannah Arendt, and normative references from Brazilian law, the article proposes alternatives to expand the reach of criminal law in response to increasingly sophisticated and subtle forms of criminality. Among the findings from the research, the traditional legal insufficiency in combating crimes involving influence and manipulation of third parties in the commission of the act can be highlighted. It is concluded that a broader criminal debate is necessary, combining both ethical and philosophical elements to demonstrate ways of addressing these criminal complexities. Theoretical references from Hans Kelsen, Immanuel Kant, and Hannah Arendt underpin the reflection, together with Brazilian criminal law and the Constitution.